Using recent advances in panel data estimation techniques, we find that an appreciation of the US dollar exchange rate leads to a significant decline in oil demand for a sample of 65 oil-importing countries. The estimated effect turns out to be much larger than the impact of a shift in the global crude oil price expressed in US dollar.
Introduction
There is a growing consensus that global crude oil price fluctuations are mainly driven by changes in the demand for oil. Hamilton (2009) Surprisingly, the role of the US dollar exchange rate has so far been ignored in these studies. Since global oil prices are predominantly expressed in US dollars, a shift in the dollar exchange rate should affect the demand for crude oil in countries that do not use the US dollar for local transactions (Austvik 1987) . When the US dollar exchange rate for instance depreciates, oil becomes less expensive in local currency for consumers in non-US dollar regions, boosting their demand for oil. The rise in oil demand for countries that do not use the dollar for local transactions should in turn influence global oil production and oil prices expressed in US dollar. This conjecture is supported by the data shown in Figure   1 . The figure shows the evolution of the real effective US dollar exchange rate, together with respectively detrended global oil production (left panel) and the real price of crude oil expressed in US dollars (right panel). As can be seen in the figure, an appreciation (depreciation) of the dollar exchange rate is typically accompanied by a decline (rise) in both global oil prices and oil production, indicating a fall (rise) in global oil demand.
The above mentioned studies, however, do not explicitly consider shifts in the US dollar exchange rate as a possible driver of global oil prices, production and consumption.
A similar argument could be made for several studies that examine the determinants of oil demand more directly. In particular, Gately prices in the estimations, but do not distinguish between local oil price movements that are caused by global oil price shifts or by changes in the exchange rate. There is, however, no a priori reason to assume that the influence of both sources of oil price shifts on oil demand is the same.
In this paper, we formally examine the role of the US dollar exchange rate as a driver of oil demand in non-US dollar regions. Specifically, we estimate the determinants of oil consumption per capita for a panel of 65 oil-importing countries over the sample period . A panel data approach is commonly used in the literature on oil (energy) demand, as it allows to exploit both the cross-section and the time dimension of the data.
We conduct panel estimations for respectively a sample of 23 OECD countries, 42 non-OECD countries and all 65 oil-importing countries. Besides real GDP per capita, we include global real crude oil prices expressed in US dollar, as well as the real US dollar exchange rate in the estimations. An explicit analysis of the role of the US dollar as a possible driver of oil consumption is a first contribution of the paper. 1 A second contribution of the paper is methodological. In particular, most existing panel data studies on oil demand do not fully take into account the specific salient features of macro panel data sets such as heterogeneity of the coefficients, unit root behavior and crosscountry dependence, even though the neglect of these matters can result in misleading estimation outcomes. We apply recent advances in panel estimation techniques that are capable to handle these econometric issues. Specifically, we (i) take into account the cointegration relationships between the variables by estimating a panel error correction oil demand model, (ii) allow for cross-country heterogeneity of the coefficients which is present in the data, and (iii) correct for cross-sectional dependence in the error terms. The application of these econometric advances turns out to matter for some of the estimated coefficients.
In support of the theory of the local price channel of oil demand, we find that an appre-ciation of the US dollar real effective exchange rate leads to a decline in oil consumption in non-US dollar regions. Strikingly, the short-run US dollar exchange rate elasticity of oil demand turns out to be much larger than the elasticity of oil demand with respect to fluctuations in the world price of crude oil expressed in US dollar. A back-of-the-enveloppe calculation furthermore suggests that shifts of the US dollar exchange rate are economically an important contributor to the volatility of the global price of crude oil expressed in US dollar, due to its influence on oil demand. These findings underline that the US dollar exchange rate should be taken into account in the analysis of global oil market dynamics and sources of oil price fluctuations.
This paper also highlights the existence of time variation and asymmetries in the reaction of oil demand to US dollar exchange rate changes, which can be considered as a third contribution. On the one hand, in line with Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) and Baumeister and Peersman (2012) , who show that the price elasticity of oil demand has declined considerably since the mid-eighties, we find a similar time shift in the response of oil demand to the dollar exchange rate. On the other hand, we find that oil consumption in OECD countries reacts asymmetrically to a strengthening or weakening US dollar, with a stronger reaction to an appreciation of the US dollar. This finding is consistent with Gately and Huntington (2002) and Huntington (2009), who document an asymmetric impact of rising versus falling oil prices on the demand for oil.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the baseline empirical model for oil demand and discuss some econometric issues. Section 3 discusses the estimation and robustness of the results, while the economic relevance is assessed in section 4. Nonlinearities of the exchange rate effects are examined in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Empirical oil demand model
In this section, we describe the benchmark oil demand model that will be used in the estimations. Our sample contains 65 oil-importing countries and covers the period 1971-2008. 2 Details of the data and a list of the countries can be found in Appendix A. Consider the following general oil demand specification for country i at time t:
where dem it is total oil consumption per capita, gdp it real income per capita, oilp t the global real US dollar crude oil price and rer t the real effective US dollar exchange rate, trend t a linear time trend and c i a country-specific constant. All variables are converted to natural logarithms, such that the model is of the constant elasticity form. (Austvik 1987) . Accordingly, we adopt the global real crude oil price expressed in US dollar, as well as the real US dollar effective exchange rate as two separate variables in our empirical oil demand model. 3 We use the US dollar real effective exchange rate rather than real bilateral exchange rates in the benchmark estimations for two reasons. First, bilateral exchange rates (or domestic CPI)
are not available for several countries over the whole sample period, which would reduce 3 The choice to use global crude oil prices is in the existing literature often motivated by the lack of availability of individual country data, which would constrain the sample (e.g. Gately and Huntington 2002) . The use of global oil prices also avoids endogeneity problems of using local oil prices. In particular, the global oil price can be considered as exogenous for individual country's oil demand. Some studies (e.g. proposed by Bai and Ng (2004) for both series. 5 The number of common factors (r)
is determined by the Bai and Ng (2002) criteria. 6 Table 1 shows that r varies between one and four, depending on the variable and the criterion under consideration. Due to the nonstationarity of the common component, both series are however found to be non-stationary 4 Frankel (2006) argues that oil and other commodity price developments are influenced by interest rates.
Specifically, when the interest rate declines, commodities become more attractive as an asset for investors.
In addition, a lower interest rate stimulates overall demand, including the demand for oil. Notice, however, that this is not relevant for our analysis since we consider oil consumption (not inventories) at the LHS of the oil demand function, while real GDP is included at the RHS. 5 Other panel unit root tests that also use a common factor representation of the data to allow for crosssection dependence (Moon and Perron 2004; Pesaran 2007 ) impose restrictions on the number of common factors and/or assume stationarity of the common factors. Given the results concerning the number and the stationarity properties of the common factors, these alternative tests are not used. 6 We consider the IC1, IC2 and BIC3 criteria. The BIC3 criterion is more robust when there is cross correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (Bai and Ng 2002 7 Notice that the GUW test is however more restrictive than residual-based tests by imposing weak exogeneity on the country-specific regressors of the ECM and strong exogeneity on the common factors, whereas residual-based tests allow for full endogeneity. To take this restriction into account, we have also applied residual-based panel cointegration tests in the spirit of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) to check the robustness of the results. 8 The results of the tests are shown in Table 2 . The pooled GUW tests reject the null hypothesis of no error correction between dem it , gdp it , oilp t and rer t for the two models under consideration. The alternative residual-based cointegration tests confirm this result. As a consequence, we can safely conclude that dem it , gdp it , oilp t and rer t are cointegrated at the panel level. 7 The common factor critique applies to residual-based panel cointegration tests as they rely on residual rather than structural dynamics (Gengenbach et al. 2008 ). 8 The approach we take to examine the robustness of the GUW test results is the following: we apply the continuously-updated and bias-corrected (CupBC) estimator of Bai et al. (2009) to the long-run cointegration equation and we test the (de-factored) residuals for a unit root using the PANIC test procedure.
Panel error correction oil demand model
Having established cointegration between the variables, we can formulate our general oil demand specification as a panel ECM:
Equation (2) is the baseline empirical specification for the panel ECMs that will be estimated in this paper. 9 Gately and Huntington (2002) and Griffin and Schulman (2005) are most closely related to our study as they both estimate single equation total oil demand models for a panel of multiple countries with a moderate time dimension. 10 Before we estimate the panel ECM, it is important to discuss a number of econometric issues which are typically ignored in the existing oil demand literature.
Econometric issues
In order to obtain reliable estimates, we need to consider two important econometric features of macro panel data. The first one concerns heterogeneity in the slope coefficients. Similarly, Griffin and Schulman (2005) , who only analyze a sample of OECD countries, do 9 The lag order of the dynamic adjustment process is imposed to be 0 for all variables for reasons of parsimony. Experiments with more lags, however, do not alter the results. 10 Gately and Huntington (2002) FE estimator suffers small T problems in dynamic panels (Arellano and Bond 1991) . Given that the time dimension of our sample is moderately large, we assume that this bias is not relevant for our purposes.
Nickell (1981) namely shows that the upward bias on the error correction term becomes insignificant when
not assess the homogeneity assumption across OECD countries. Given the cross-country differences in economic structures, the assumption of homogenous slope coefficients is questionable. The homogeneity assumption could, however, easily be tested by means of a Hausman or likelihood-ratio test. Indeed, the application of both tests consistently reveals that the homogeneity restriction on the slope coefficients is not valid, even not for a subsample of OECD countries (see Table 3 ). The FE estimator is hence biased and the estimated coefficients potentially misleading. Accordingly, we use the Mean Group (MG) estimator in the analysis, which offers a consistent alternative as the MG estimator does not impose homogeneity.
The second important feature of macro panel data estimations relates to error cross- shows that there is a significant degree of cross-sectional correlation in the error terms for both the FE and MG estimators (see Table 3 ), which confirms our concern about possible biased results of existing panel studies that do not take into account the dependence.
The common correlated effects (CCE) estimators of Pesaran (2006) , notably the CCE pooled (CCEP) and mean group (CCEMG) estimators, are typically used to eliminate cross-sectional dependence. In particular, the CCE estimators use the cross-section averages of the dependent and explanatory variables as observable proxies for a linear combination of unobserved common factors. This approach asymptotically eliminates strong and weak forms of cross-section dependence and is consistent for both stationary and nonstationary common factors (Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata 2010). A non-standard feature of our specification, however, is the presence of observed common factors as explanatory variables, namely the global real price of oil (oilp t ) and the real effective US dollar exchange rate (rer t ), which makes the standard application of the CCE approach of Pesaran (2006) unattractive. 11 We therefore opted to apply the Bai and Ng (2004) PANIC decomposition to the residuals of the model in order to estimate the common components in the residuals. In the spirit of Bai, Kao and Ng (2009), the estimated common factor(s)
is (are) then in a second step included in the model to get consistent estimates. This procedure allows us to remove, or at least significantly reduce, the common factors that are present in the residuals of the first step. 12 By including the estimated common components of the residuals of the MG regression as a proxy for omitted common variables in the model, we indeed notice a substantial decline of the cross-sectional correlation in the residuals.
In sum, in contrast to the existing empirical evidence on the demand for oil, we do not only examine the role of the US dollar exchange rate for the demand for oil, we also apply panel estimators that take both heterogeneity of the coefficients and cross-sectional dependence into account.
3 Empirical results Table 3 summarizes the estimation results of the panel error correction model as described in section 2. In order to compare with the existing evidence, we report the results for respectively OECD countries, non-OECD countries and the total sample of oil-importing countries. 13 For each sample, we show the results for the FE, MG and MG estimator adjusted for cross-sectional dependence (MG_Ft), which should allow us to evaluate the relevance of the econometric features discussed in section 2.3 for the estimation results. The econometric issues that we discussed in section 2.3 seem to matter for the magnitudes of the estimates. Specifically, the short-run income elasticity for OECD countries rises from 0.568 to 0.672 if we do not take into account cross-sectional dependence in the error terms, and even to 0.741 if we also do not allow for cross-country heterogeneity in the coefficients. Interestingly, exactly the opposite happens for non-OECD countries, i.e.
Panel estimations
the short-run income elasticity declines from 0.639 to respectively 0.615 and 0.537 when there is not allowed for correlation and heterogeneity across countries. In other words, the bias resulting from the use of a FE estimator is relevant and could work in both directions.
Moving to the long-run income elasticity, there is one caveat that needs to be discussed first. In particular, for some countries in the panel, there seems to be no or only very weak cointegration present in the data. This implies that the estimated error-correction terms for a few countries are very close to zero, which in turn inflates the long-run coefficients for these countries considerably because there has to be divided by the near-zero error correction term to calculate the long-run coefficients. As a consequence, the values of the mean group and the standard errors of the long-run panel coefficients are distorted.
To take this feature into account, we also report the median of the estimated long-run parameters in the tables and interpret them with a pinch of salt. 14 The median long-run income elasticity turns out to be 0.674, 0.885 and 0.775 for respectively OECD, non-OECD and all 65 oil-importing countries, which basically falls within the range of existing studies.
(Global) oil price elasticity There are numerous papers that estimate the effects of a shift in (global) crude oil prices on the demand for oil. Most studies report a relatively low, or even an insignificant (e.g. Askari and Krichene 2010) short-run price elasticity of oil demand, which is important because a low oil price elasticity implies that any disruption in oil production has a considerable impact on the price of oil. As can be seen in Table   3 , we find a significant negative (short-run) effect of a change in the global price of crude oil expressed in US dollars on the demand for oil in OECD-countries ( correlation turn out to be very similar for the OECD sample. This is, however, not the case for the panel of non-OECD countries. In particular, the effect of global crude oil prices on oil demand is only significant when we allow for cross-country heterogeneity in the slope coefficients and take into account cross-section dependence in the errors terms.
Hence, the econometric issues that we have discussed in section 2.3 do also matter for the estimated oil price elasticity.
We further find a stronger response of oil demand to a global oil price shift in the long run. The estimated median long-run price elasticities are respectively -0.150 and -0.104
for OECD and non-OECD countries. As a benchmark, Gately and Huntington (2002) find for OECD and non-OECD countries a value of respectively -0.59 and -0.16 with a FE estimator.
Exchange rate elasticity Our results reveal that there is a considerable effect of the US dollar exchange rate on oil demand in the rest of the world, despite the fact that we control for country-specific real GDP and global crude oil prices, which supports the theory of a local price channel of oil demand. More specifically, when the US dollar real effective exchange rate appreciates by 1 percent, there is a short-run decline in oil demand of 0.204 percent in OECD countries. Strikingly, the estimated elasticity is four times bigger than the global crude oil price elasticity expressed in US dollar. The equality of the short-run price and real exchange rate elasticity is rejected at the panel level. 15 The negative effect of the exchange rate on oil demand in OECD countries increases even further to 0.385 in the long run (median estimate), a value which is still more than twice (median) long-run elasticity of the global oil price determined in US dollar of -0.150.
The short-run impact of the US dollar exchange rate on oil demand in non-OECD countries is much lower (-0.051) and statistically not even significant. Notice that the latter is not the case for the FE estimator that is typically used in the oil demand literature, which confirms our conjecture that not taking into account the salient features of macro panel data sets could be misleading for the interpretation of the results. Finally, the US dollar real effective exchange rate elasticity for the total sample of 65 oil-importing countries is -0.105 and significant, which is three times larger than the global oil price elasticity expressed in US dollar for the same sample of countries. In sum, the US dollar exchange rate matters for oil demand in countries which do not use the dollar as a currency for local transactions. In the next subsection, we assess the robustness of this novel finding.
Robustness checks
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the results for possible endogeneity problems between oil demand and the US dollar exchange rate. When oil demand of the individual countries affects the US dollar effective exchange rate on impact, the estimated elasticity could be biased. Specifically, given the fact that oil is predominantly traded in US dollar and our sample contains the main trading partners of the US, fluctuations in the demand for oil in these countries could affect the effective US dollar exchange rate. 16 Remark that, if such a bias is present, the true exchange rate elasticity of oil demand is probably even larger than the one we have reported above. An increase in a country's oil demand raises for instance its demand for US dollars, leading to an appreciation of the dollar, which could reduce the estimated (negative) elasticity.
To check the robustness of the results, we have therefore re-estimated the baseline panel error correction oil demand models with instrumental variables (IV). In particular,
we instrument the first difference of the US dollar real effective exchange rate in equation 2 by the first difference and the level of the US federal funds rate, the lagged level of the 16 Note that this could also be the case for the global price of crude oil. To our knowledge, however, all existing cross-country panel studies on the demand for oil assume that oil demand of an individual country does not influence the global price of crude oil on impact, including the US, which has a share in world oil consumption of 27% over the sample period. Since the focus of this paper is not the price elasticity of oil demand, and because we do not have the US in our sample, we do not question this assumption. It is also difficult to find reasonable instruments for the global price of crude oil.
US dollar real effective exchange rate and a constant. The results are shown in the left part of Table 4 .
The price and income elasticity coefficients are comparable to the benchmark results reported in section 3.1. More importantly, there is still a significant effect of the US dollar exchange rate on the demand for oil in countries that do not use the US dollar as a currency for local transactions. The (short-run) exchange rate elasticity is now even statistically significant for non-OECD countries. The estimated elasticities are also larger than the benchmark results, pointing to a possible downward bias of the benchmark results due to the endogeneity of the US dollar exchange rate. We obviously have to be careful when interpreting the magnitudes of the coefficients given the loss of power of twostage regressions with instrumental variables, in particular for a financial variable such as the exchange rate. Nevertheless, these results confirm the significance of the US dollar exchange rate for the consumption of crude oil in non-US regions.
As an additional robustness check, we have also estimated a specification with bilateral real exchange rates instead of the US real effective exchange rate. We again opt for IV estimations, with the same instruments as described above. The right part of Table 4 shows the results. Notice that the sample size for the different groups of countries is now smaller due to the non-availibility of bilateral exchange rate and/or domestic CPI data for some countries over the time period under consideration (see Appendix A). This change of sample size should thus be taken into account when comparing the results. Interestingly, the short-run coefficients turn out to be similar to the benchmark results. In particular, the (bilateral) exchange rate elasticity is significantly negative for the OECD sample and the total sample of countries, although the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are slightly larger than the benchmark results. The impact of the exchange rate on the demand for oil in non-OECD countries is, however, again not significant. Finally, the median long-run exchange rate elasticities and the median long-run income elasticity for the OECD sample of countries appear to be somewhat lower than the baseline results.
Global elasticities and economic relevance
In this section, we evaluate the relevance of our findings for global oil market dynamics.
More precisely, we first calculate global elasticities, which could serve as a benchmark for empirical studies that estimate global oil demand functions based on aggregate oil market data. In a next step, we perform a back-of-the-enveloppe calculation in order to assess how important fluctuations in the US dollar exchange rate are for global crude oil production and prices.
Global elasticities The estimated elasticities reported in section 3 are the unweighted averages of the individual country coefficients. However, average elasticities are not very useful for the analysis of the global oil market, which is essentially a weighted average of all individual countries in the world. To have a better idea about the relevance of the US dollar exchange rate for global oil demand, we have also derived weighted MG estimates of the panel error correction oil demand model, where the weights of the country-specific coefficients are determined by the share of the respective country in total oil demand over the sample. Accordingly, countries with a larger share in global oil demand have more weight such that the resulting MG estimates better represent global elasticities. Given that our sample represents 59 percent of non-US global oil demand, we could safely assume that the weighted estimates are a good approximation for global (non-US) oil demand. Table 5 shows the results for the total sample of 65 countries, as well as the unweighted estimates for a comparison. The global short-run income and oil price elasticities are both still significant. 17 Interestingly, the global (weighted) income elasticity is lower than its unweighted counterpart, whereas the global price elasticity of crude oil demand is somewhat larger. In particular, the estimated global income and oil price elasticity are percent. According to our simple back-of-the-enveloppe calculation, this corresponds to an average shift in global oil prices by more than 2.04 percent. Given the fact that the monthly average of |∆p oil | in the data is 4.76 percent, the relevance of US dollar exchange rate fluctuations for global oil price dynamics is considerable. Due to the very low oil supply elasticity, this is less the case for oil production. In particular, the monthly average of |∆q oil | in the data is 1.08 percent, whereas exchange rate fluctuations could only explain about 0.05 percent according to our simple calculations.
US dollar exchange rate and nonlinearities of oil demand
Having established a significant impact of shifts in the US dollar exchange rate on oil demand, in this section, we examine whether the effects are (non)linear. Specifically, previous work has found a fall in the short-run price elasticity of oil demand over time Huntington 2002). Hence, it would be interesting to see whether similar nonlinearities also exist for the effects of the US dollar exchange rate.
Time variation of exchange rate elasticity
There is a consensus in the literature that the short-run price elasticity of oil demand has On the other hand, Baumeister and Peersman (2012) argue that also structural changes in the oil market itself could be a reason for the declined price elasticity of oil demand over time. Baumeister and Peersman (2012) argue that high capacity utilization rates in crude oil production since the second half of the eighties increases the willingness of oil consumers to pay an insurance premium for potential oil scarcity, resulting in a higher share of less elastic speculative or precautionary buying in the oil market. If this structural change in the oil market is the dominant reason for the observed time variation of the price elasticity of oil demand, there is no reason to expect that the demand for oil is subject to a fall in its reaction to US dollar exchange rate changes over time.
In order to examine whether the US dollar exchange rate elasticity also decreases over time, we add the US dollar real effective exchange rate interacted with a simple linear time trend as an additional variable to the baseline panel ECM:
The results of these estimations are shown in Table 6 . The first three columns of the table reveal that the impact of the US dollar real effective exchange rate became indeed smaller over time. In particular, the exchange rate elasticity has over time decreased on average by 0.013 per year in OECD countries, by 0.012 in non-OECD countries, and by 0.012 for the total sample of 65 countries. The estimated interaction coefficients are statistically significant for the OECD and total sample of countries, but not for the non-OECD countries (the p-value for non-OECD countries is 0.163). In sum, the results denote the presence of a declining short-run exchange rate elasticity over time, similar to the evidence on the short-run price elasticity documented in the existing literature.
Appreciations versus depreciations
Another popular asymmetry in the price elasticity of oil demand documented in the literature is a stronger effect of oil price increases relative to a decline in oil prices. The basic idea is that higher prices induce more investment in energy-efficient equipment and retrofitting of existing capital, such as switching to energy-efficient cars and greater insulation. When prices fall, however, there is no switch back to less-efficient capital, although there could be more intensive usage, e.g. driving more miles and adjusting thermostats to more comfortable levels (Griffin and Schulman 2005). Gately and Huntington (2002) allow for a different reaction of oil demand to price increases that result in a new historical maximum price, to price increases back to the previous maximum and to price decreases.
They find that oil demand responds differently to the different price shifts, with the largest (negative) effect of price increases that result in new maximum values.
We examine whether there exists a similar asymmetry in the reaction of oil demand to a US dollar appreciation versus a depreciation by adding to the benchmark panel ECM the interaction between the real effective exchange rate with a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an appreciation of the US dollar effective exchange rate and 0 otherwise: 19
The results are shown in the middle part of Table 6 . The interaction term is only significant for the sample of OECD countries. The existence of an asymmetric reaction to a strenghtening versus a weakening US dollar is thus confined to this group. The estimated degree of asymmetry is notably large, i.e. a depreciating US dollar does not invoke a significant oil demand reaction in OECD countries, whereas an appreciating US dollar leads to a considerable decline in oil products demand. The results further reveal that there is no (significant) asymmetry present in non-OECD countries and the total sample of countries. The estimated coefficients have even the opposite (expected) sign. (2002) primarily reflect energy-saving technology rather than price asymmetry. More specifically, they show that the evidence for oil price asymmetry vanishes once time effects that serve as proxies for technological change are incorporated in the model of Gately and Huntington (2002) . To take this into account, we have also verified whether the existence of an asymmetric response of oil demand to an appreciating versus depreciating US dollar exchange rate still holds once we control for time variation in the exchange rate elasticity. 20 In particular, we have re-estimated the panel ECM allowing for both forms of nonlinearities.
Griffin and Schulman (2005) argue that the results of Gately and Huntington
As such, we could also check whether the decline of the exchange rate elasticity over time, which we have documented in section 5.1, still holds after controlling for an appreciating versus depreciating US dollar. Given that the US dollar experienced a persistent depreciation after its peak level at the beginning of 1985, it is not unlikely that both nonlinearities interfere. These results can be found in the last three columns of Table 6 . Again, the interaction term of the dummy variable and the real effective exchange rate regressor is only significant for the OECD sample. Also the trend interaction term coefficients remain more or less the same. The results are thus robust for this extension, i.e. both linearities are still present in the data.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the role of the US dollar exchange rate for the demand for oil in non-US dollar regions by using recent advances in panel data estimation techniques.
In particular, we have estimated a panel error correction oil demand model allowing for cross-country heterogeneity in the slope coefficients and taking into account cross-country common unobserved variables. The results show that an appreciation of the US dollar exchange rate robustly leads to a decline in the demand for oil in countries that do not use the US dollar for local transactions, which supports the existence of a so-called local price channel of oil demand. Strikingly, a 1 percent shift in the real US dollar exchange rate seems to have a much stronger effect on oil demand than a 1 percent shift in the global real crude oil price determined in US dollar. The reason for this stronger effect is beyond the scope of this paper, but could be a promising avenue for future research. Potential directions are the lower volatility of the US dollar exchange rate compared to global oil prices, different hedging activities in the oil and exchange rate market or the fact that the real exchange rate is mean reverting.
In addition, we have highlighted the existence of nonlinearities in the exchange rate elasticity of oil demand. The estimations reveal that the impact of US dollar exchange rate shifts on the demand for oil has become smaller over time. Moreover, oil consumption reacts asymmetrically to a rising or falling US dollar, with a larger reaction to an appreciation of the US dollar.
A Data
Sources and construction of the data:
• Total oil demand (1000 barrels per day): IEA, Oil Information database : respectively refer to the short-run rer elasticity coefficients of a depreciating/appreciating (effective) US dollar 
